Recent developments reveal a dramatic escalation in centrist opposition to democratic participation within liberal democracies. As reported by The Atlantic, centrist liberal writers have been emboldened to expressly call for less public participation in government, with prolific pedant Matthew Yglesias recently stating, 'What we need is fewer engaged people.' The Abundance Network has characterized widespread grassroots fundraising as making politics 'dumber,' arguing that small-dollar donors tend to be more liberal than traditional big-dollar supporters and push Democrats away from median voter preferences. This represents a significant shift from the postwar consensus where democracy was the senior partner to free markets, with neoliberal thought now reversing this fundamental principle. The irony is that centrist opposition to popular participation is occurring simultaneously with the right's intense fight against democratic foundations, including gerrymandering wars, assaults on mail-in voting, and efforts to deploy federal agents to polling places.
According to reports from Business Standard, liberal democracies demonstrated superior financial capabilities during the 20th century's major conflicts. The United Kingdom's public debt increased from 25% of GDP in 1914 to 135% by 1919, while the United States' debt rose from 3% to 33% of GDP over the same period. Between 1937 and 1945, the UK borrowed heavily, taking debt from 154% to 250% of GDP, while the US pushed debt from 40% to 119%. This financial scale was significantly larger than what populist regimes could achieve, as they lacked the institutional machinery to channel private savings into state power.
As reported by Business Standard, the capability to borrow constitutes the strategic depth of the state. Successful liberal democracies borrow from a deep financial system on a voluntary basis, creating fiscal space to act during exceptional events. During the 2020 pandemic, the US government expanded borrowing by 21% of GDP in a single year to finance the state response. This flexibility requires two conditions: low baseline indebtedness and trust from voluntary lenders worldwide, which requires centuries of experience with fair play and respect for property rights.
According to Business Standard, the developed world faces limited fiscal space in the current geopolitical environment. Debt stands at 121% of GDP in the US, 237% in Japan, 101% in the UK, and 89% in the euro area. The West possesses large GDP but is weighed down by debt, making it harder to mount the muscular fiscal expansion seen in the 20th century when faced with hostile populist regimes.
As reported by Business Standard, India lacks both elements required for strategic depth in public finance. The state relies on financial repression, with voluntary lenders supplying perhaps 5% of the borrowing when captive buyers are stripped away. The Indian state runs primary deficits in normal times and operates near the edge of fiscal constraints, with debt-to-GDP ratio at 84.4%. This chronic fiscal indiscipline prevents the state from generating primary surpluses of ₹100 in each Budget, resulting in a large and chronic debt burden that limits the ability to respond to crises with massive borrowing.
