
On October 26, the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) imposed costs of ₹1 lakh on the Multi Commodity Exchange of India Limited (MCX) and set aside a penalty of ₹1.5 crore imposed on a trading member. According to reports from Business Standard, the order was signed by X, who had ceased to be a member six months earlier, with MCX admitting this was a 'bona fide error'. The alleged contravention occurred on May 23, 2024, but MCX issued the show-cause notice on August 14, 2024, heard the matter on January 20, 2025, and passed the order on September 28, 2026 - more than 28 months after the alleged contravention and over 20 months after the hearing. The SAT did not investigate whose 'bona fide error' it was or how it occurred, leaving unclear whether MCX has fixed responsibility for the error, how many other cases involved similar errors, and what measures it has taken to prevent their recurrence.
As reported by Business Standard, exchanges exercise penal powers without comparable safeguards to those governing SEBI's penalty procedures. While SEBI must follow the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, which specifies contraventions, prescribes penalty ranges, and requires adjudicating officers to consider gains, losses, and default repetition, exchanges operate under circulars and bye-laws that are not laid before Parliament. The penalty proceeds are credited to Investor Protection Funds rather than the Consolidated Fund of India, creating potential conflicts where exchanges determine sanctions whose proceeds accrue to funds they maintain. This arrangement deserves scrutiny both for its consistency with the parent statute and for the incentives it creates, potentially encouraging prompt recovery even while the member retains the right to challenge the order.
According to the analysis in Business Standard, the 20-month gap between hearing and decision raises questions about evidence consideration, while MCX directed the penalty to be debited from the noticee's settlement account within seven days despite the law allowing 45 days for appeals. The exchange imposed ₹1.5 crore, 75 times the statutory ceiling, and levied goods and services tax, raising the total demand to ₹1.77 crore. The case illustrates risks of leaving penalty amounts and procedures outside the statutory framework governing regulators, with most such orders not publicly available for scrutiny. There is an additional irony in that after taking more than two years to decide the case, the exchange displayed little urgency in deciding the matter but considerable urgency in recovering the money, directing the noticee to 'take immediate corrective measures' while the law allows 45 days to appeal an order.
As reported by Business Standard, the Securities Markets Code offers an opportunity to correct these deficiencies by expressly conferring clearly bounded monetary penalty powers on Market Infrastructure Institutions (MIIs). The article suggests that the exercise of quasi-judicial powers by MIIs should be subject to procedural and institutional safeguards comparable to those applicable to SEBI, with transparency about committee composition, hearing participation, and order authorship essential for credible quasi-judicial proceedings. MIIs must be bound by rules that leave little room for 'bona fide' errors while maintaining their essential role in market integrity. The arrangement also creates a potential conflict where the exchange imposing the penalty determines a sanction whose proceeds accrue to a fund it maintains, requiring scrutiny both for its consistency with the parent statute and for the incentives it creates.