
The $6.4 billion theft from Binance was executed through a sophisticated multi-stage hacking effort that began in June 2026 and triggered a series of security breaches that culminated in the record-breaking heist. According to Binance's latest incident report, the attack began when an engineer downloaded a tampered installation package for an AI coding tool in June, though the exchange detected the anomaly and replaced the device. Even as Binance scrambled to lock down its system and freeze withdrawals after detecting the attack late on Thursday, the hackers were still making off with crypto from the exchange nearly four hours after the first theft. The stolen funds were moved across 10 separate blockchains with most transfers completed in approximately 20 minutes, representing more than four times the amount stolen in the Bybit hack of February 2025.
The most consequential part of the intrusion involved Ethereum-based exploitation of EIP-7702, a mechanism that allows externally owned accounts to delegate execution to smart-contract code. According to Binance's incident report, the attackers used compromised signing infrastructure to grant malicious code execution rights over an Ethereum hot wallet, with 50 signed transactions involved in manipulating the account's nonce and establishing the delegation. The unsettling aspect was that these permissions remained valid on-chain even after Binance suspended withdrawals and shut down its hot-wallet services. As reported by AMBCrypto, the exchange could stop its own systems but could not simply switch off the authority the attackers had already established on Ethereum. The final reported unauthorized Ethereum transfer occurred at 23:56 UTC, involving 2,961.9 ETH, with the exchange clearing the malicious EIP-7702 delegation at 00:10 UTC on October 30th.
The attack revealed critical vulnerabilities in Binance's deposit consolidation system, which continued collecting funds into a compromised Ethereum wallet identified as Binance 14 even after the breach was detected. According to Four Pillars analysis dated November 4th, the compromised wallet was still receiving money during the attack, allowing the attacker to sweep newly arriving assets. Nexus Mutual's reconstruction shows particularly striking sequences, including 200 million USDT swept at approximately 21:44 UTC, with the attacker receiving the funds just 72 seconds after another Binance-labelled wallet deposited them. This demonstrated how operational systems can continue directing funds towards dangerous destinations even while emergency procedures are being implemented. The incident highlights the challenge of interrupting internal asset flows during a breach, requiring separate containment controls beyond simple withdrawal suspension.
Despite the attack's sophistication, Binance managed to secure substantial portions of the stolen assets through coordinated efforts with stablecoin issuers and law enforcement. According to Binance's November 3rd report, the exchange froze or intercepted approximately $2.85 billion through cooperation with issuers, law enforcement, and blockchain intelligence firms. By November 4th, the exchange reported replenishing approximately 98% of affected holdings through replacement purchases, demonstrating considerable financial capacity to absorb the losses rather than pass them on to users. However, as noted by AMBCrypto, the distinction between suspension and actual asset recovery is crucial - suspension alone could not stop every unauthorized movement, and the exchange's disclosures do not establish a reconciled post-suspension loss figure. The company also reported a CFO transition from Kaiser Ng to Justin Yek on November 8, 2026.
The Binance incident, following the $1.5 billion Bybit hack in February 2025, reveals fundamental vulnerabilities in exchange security infrastructure that extend beyond simple withdrawal controls. According to AMBCrypto's analysis, the episodes demonstrate that much depends on the integrity of the authority behind a transaction, with multiple signatures offering limited protection when signers are misled about what they are approving. The incidents expose critical questions about emergency preparedness, with experts suggesting exchanges should prove they can revoke compromised permissions and move exposed assets to safety even if their own signing systems are compromised. As noted by Carlos Vendrell of Zealynx Security, emergency procedures should be tested under exactly those conditions, starting from a list of every approval and delegation each hot wallet has given. The analysis highlights the importance of regulatory oversight, particularly Brazil's Central Bank Resolutions 519, 520 and 521 of 2025, which mandate customer asset segregation and independent audits, while emphasizing that the most valuable protection is regulatory framework ensuring proper asset segregation that self-custody cannot provide.