The GENIUS Act prohibits permitted payment stablecoin issuers from paying interest or yield to holders, though Fisher noted this restriction applies to issuers rather than how holders use tokens after receiving them. Under current U.S. stablecoin issuance rules, permitted issuers cannot pay interest or yield to holders, with the federal framework requiring eligible payment stablecoins to carry one-to-one backing with approved liquid reserves and defined redemption rights. The controversy lies in gray areas where if issuers cannot pay interest, can trading platforms, wallets, or affiliated companies issue "rewards"? If rewards are calculated based on balance and holding period, what economic difference does it have from interest? Subsequent negotiations around market structure legislation attempt to navigate these boundaries, with banks wanting to extend the ban to exchanges and other service providers while the crypto industry argues against lumping rebates, loyalty rewards, and trading incentives into one blanket prohibition.
Sky's agent model demonstrates how yield-bearing stablecoins operate through intermediaries, with Standard Chartered reporting that three major agents, Spark, Grove and Obex, collectively had $5.9 billion in USDS borrowings when the report was published. The structure gives Sky a relatively direct way to turn growth in stablecoin supply into revenue, with the bank arguing that increasing outstanding USDS loans should increase net interest income, part of which ultimately flows to SKY holders through staking rewards and token buybacks. Sky's own data shows the scale of the yield-bearing side, with its financial dashboard reporting roughly $4.94 billion deposited into USDS savings, while its sUSDS product currently advertises a variable yield. The model represents a different economic profile from traditional token buyback stories, with Standard Chartered estimating that 45% of eligible income goes toward SKY staker rewards and 10% toward SKY buybacks.
The timing puts Sky into broader competition for stablecoin market roles, with banks exploring their own stablecoins and traditional asset managers already involved in tokenized strategies. Sky says more than $5.5 billion has been deployed through its agents into instruments and platforms involving firms including BlackRock, Janus Henderson, Anchorage and Securitize. Standard Chartered's 5x forecast depends heavily on Sky expanding USDS circulation through its agent network, with current borrowing caps for Spark, Grove and Obex totaling $17.5 billion compared to $5.9 billion of existing borrowings. Kendrick estimates reaching those limits could generate another two to three times growth, assuming interest spreads remain stable. The bank expects the overall stablecoin market could reach $2 trillion by the end of 2028, though it remains difficult to predict how much will be yield-bearing products.
According to Fisher's comments to crypto.news, independent DeFi protocols could earn returns through overcollateralized loans, market makers financing inventory, or users paying to borrow the asset. He compared this arrangement to the separation between a bank deposit and a money-market fund, stating that "the yield comes from what the cash is lent against, not from the bank that minted it." Fisher emphasized that the source of return determines sustainability, with interest from borrowers representing economic demand rather than rewards from protocol governance token issuance. The Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025 (H.R. 3633) primarily aims to delineate jurisdictional boundaries between the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission over digital assets, establishing a regulatory framework for digital commodities issuance, trading, and intermediation.
According to Fisher's analysis reported by crypto.news, corporate treasurers evaluating DeFi stablecoin opportunities should focus on transparent economic activity, predictable liquidity, conservative collateral, real-time reporting, and defined responses to failures. Operational requirements include round-the-clock settlement capabilities and counterparties able to function under stress conditions. Fisher rejected the idea that DeFi had solved the problem of unproductive digital dollars, noting that DefiLlama recorded approximately $305.3 billion in stablecoins and about $87.6 billion in DeFi total value locked, leaving much of the stablecoin supply outside deposited DeFi capital. The Financial Stability Board emphasizes that global stablecoins must possess effective stabilization mechanisms, clear redemption rights, robust risk management, and cross-border supervisory arrangements. The model also carries different risks from traditional stablecoins, with Standard Chartered warning that demand for USDS and yield-bearing stablecoins will ultimately depend on how stablecoin use cases develop.
