
The Mumbai-Goa highway, officially National Highway 66 (NH-66), was conceived to connect the financial capital to the Konkan coast and Goa with a smooth four-lane corridor. Construction began in earnest around 2007, with an initial completion target of December 2018. However, as deadlines came and went, the project became synonymous with delays and cost escalations.
These pending stretches, ranging from 89% to 98.5% complete, were responsible for an estimated cost overrun of over Rs 2,000 crore.
The reasons for the delays were a complex mix of systemic issues and contractor-specific failures. On one hand, land acquisition, environmental clearances, and local protests consistently hampered progress. On the other, the financial distress of key contractors brought work to a standstill, forcing the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) and the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) to terminate contracts and re-tender critical sections. The result was a project where costs ballooned while commuters continued to navigate traffic bottlenecks and accident-prone zones.
The Panvel-Indapur stretch, spanning 84.6 km, was one of the first major bottlenecks. Originally awarded in 2010-11 to a consortium led by Supreme Infrastructure India on a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis, the project completed only 36 km by 2017. The consortium, which included subsidiaries of China State Construction Engineering and Mahavir Roads, soon ran into trouble. Supreme Infrastructure defaulted on bank loans and found itself on the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) list of top-100 bank defaulters in 2019.
The financial collapse had a direct impact on the ground. NHAI terminated the consortium’s contract in 2021, though the exact link between the RBI listing and the termination is not explicitly documented in official sources. The project company, Supreme Panvel Indapur Tollways Pvt Ltd, entered the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). For the parent company, the path to survival involved a drastic debt restructuring.
By October 2026, the company reported that its composite scheme was complete, all asset charges were released, and its net worth had turned positive. Investor Presentation
However, the restructuring came too late to save the original timeline. The Panvel-Indapur stretch had to be split and re-awarded. The Panvel-Kasu section (42.3 km) went to J M Mhatre Infra in January 2023, while the Kasu-Indapur section (42.3 km) was awarded to Kalyan Toll Infrastructure in November 2022. As of early 2025, the Panvel-Kasu concreting was largely complete, barring one vehicular underpass, while Kalyan Toll had concreted 30 km of its section, aiming for a mid-2025 finish.
The Arawali-Kante section (39.24 km) presented a similar tale of financial distress. Awarded in 2017 to a joint venture of MEP Infrastructure Developers and San Jose India, the project faced significant delays. The joint venture defaulted on a Rs 128 crore loan from Intec Capital, leading the NCLT to initiate CIRP against MEP in March 2024. The reasons for the default were a mix of cash flow problems, local compensation demands, and protests, which stalled progress and choked revenue streams.
With MEP in insolvency, the ministry had no choice but to re-invite tenders. In 2024, the contract was awarded to Hazoor Infra Projects Pvt Ltd, a special purpose vehicle incorporated in October 2023 and promoted by Hazoor Multi Projects. The new contractor faced its own set of challenges, including hill cutting at four locations and the Sangameshwar bridge approach. A top executive from Hazoor Infra stated that the remaining work would be done in a month, but complications arose from blasting in populated areas and land acquisition issues involving a railway section, a temple, and a crematorium.
The cost implications of this delay were stark.
While the overall project’s cost escalation was driven primarily by land acquisition and scope changes, the contractor’s insolvency added a layer of financial and administrative complexity that undoubtedly contributed to the overrun.
The re-awarding of contracts brought its own set of controversies, particularly involving contractors with political connections. J M Mhatre Infra, which won the Panvel-Kasu section, became the subject of an Enforcement Directorate (ED) probe in June 2025. The ED alleged that Mhatre illegally acquired forest land in Panvel through forged documents and then surrendered it to NHAI in exchange for compensation, receiving Rs 42.4 crore in the process. Notably, the contract was awarded in January 2023, before the ED investigation became public, and Mhatre’s switch from the Peasants and Workers Party (PWP) to the BJP occurred in May 2025, two years after the award.
Similarly, the selection of Hazoor Infra for the Arawali-Kante section raised eyebrows due to the background of its promoter, Radheshyam Mopalwar. A former IAS officer, Mopalwar had previously served as the Vice Chairman and Managing Director of the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC) and was credited with overseeing the Samruddhi Mahamarg expressway project. While his experience was undeniable, the appointment highlighted the revolving door between government and the private infrastructure sector. The company, however, secured the project through a re-tendering process necessitated by MEP’s insolvency, and there is no evidence in public sources to suggest that Mopalwar’s past roles influenced the selection.
The financial toll of these delays is immense. The sanctioned cost of the ten four-laning packages between Indapur and Zarap (355 km), executed by Maharashtra PWD, rose from Rs 11,409 crore to Rs 16,909.22 crore, a 48% increase. Cumulative expenditure had already reached Rs 11,577 crore, exceeding the original sanctioned budget even as work remained incomplete. The steepest single-package escalation was recorded on the Parshuram Ghat-Arawali stretch, where costs jumped 126%, from Rs 983 crore to Rs 2,226 crore.
Contractor defaults, while not the sole driver, were a significant exacerbating factor. The terminations, insolvency proceedings, and subsequent re-tendering processes added years to the timeline and inflated costs through legal fees, re-mobilization expenses, and inflation.
In response to this systemic failure, MoRTH has instituted stricter norms for future projects.
Furthermore, at least 90% of land acquisition should be finished before a project is awarded to a contractor. The ministry has also adopted a more aggressive stance towards non-performing contractors, terminating their services and fixing cost limits on projects handed to state Public Works Departments (PWDs).
The impact of these new mandates remains to be seen. They directly address the land and clearance issues that plagued projects like Panvel-Indapur and Arawali-Kante. However, they do little to mitigate the risks of contractor financial distress, which was the root cause of the Supreme and MEP debacles. As the final stretches of the Mumbai-Goa highway inch towards completion, the project stands as a cautionary tale. It highlights the need for not just better planning and land management, but also for rigorous financial vetting of contractors to ensure that the nation’s infrastructure ambitions do not become hostages to corporate insolvency.