CMR Green Technologies is the real thing in a way most IPO candidates are not. It is the leading non-ferrous metal recycler in India by installed capacity as of March 31, 2025, with the highest market share in the domestic secondary aluminium market by revenue for Fiscal 2025, and an installed capacity around four times its nearest domestic competitor — all per the ICRA Report commissioned for the prospectus. It supplies liquid aluminium alloy and ingots to Maruti Suzuki, Honda Cars, Bajaj Auto, Hero MotoCorp and Royal Enfield. And here is the tension the entire offer turns on. In the nine months ended December 31, 2025, the company reported profit after tax of ₹1,623.94 million. Over the same nine months, its operations consumed ₹3,877.04 million of cash. In the full year before that, FY2025, it earned ₹1,550.38 million in profit while operations bled ₹920.03 million. This is a market leader reporting earnings faster than it is collecting them — and the IPO asking the public to buy in is a pure Offer for Sale (OFS), where existing shareholders cash out and the company itself receives nothing. ## What CMR actually does Strip away the green-technology framing and CMR is a scrap-to-metal converter. It imports aluminium scrap, melts and refines it, and sells recycled aluminium alloys — as solid ingots and, for customers with adjacent plants, as molten "liquid aluminium" delivered hot. Recycled aluminium needs a fraction of the energy of mining and smelting virgin metal, which is the genuine structural tailwind here: as the auto industry decarbonises, secondary aluminium is the cheaper, lower-carbon input, and CMR sits at the front of that queue domestically. The metrics that matter are not revenue growth — they are spread and working-capital intensity. A recycler buys scrap and sells alloy; its profit is the gap between the two, minus conversion cost. Because scrap is bought globally and alloy is sold on credit to large auto buyers, the business ties up enormous cash in inventory and receivables. Inventory days rose from 38 in FY2023 to 51 for the nine months ended December 2025, and trade receivable days rose from 34 in FY2023 to 43 in FY2025. Those two numbers are the whole story of where the cash goes. On the operational record, the company is credible. Installed capacity was 605,850 MTPA across 13 facilities as of December 31, 2025. It holds joint ventures with Toyota Tsusho, Nikkei MC Aluminium and Nippon Light Metal, and reports roughly 42–45% volume share in the cast-alloy segment for the automotive industry in FY2025. Customer concentration is moderate: the top five customers contributed 32.53% of consolidated revenue for the nine months ended December 2025, and the customer count grew to 137. ## The numbers behind the growth story Revenue has barely moved across the disclosed full years — year-on-year growth of 12.00% in FY2025 and 1.43% in FY2024. | ₹ in million | 9M ended Dec 31, 2025 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:| | Revenue from operations | 62,755.24 | 66,664.85 | 59,524.42 | 58,685.07 | | EBITDA | 3,244.38 | 3,037.17 | 2,174.04 | 2,070.14 | | EBITDA margin (RHP-stated) | 5.17% | 4.56% | 3.65% | 3.53% | | Profit/(loss) after tax | 1,623.94 | 1,550.38 | (8,385.57) | 1,045.07 | | PAT margin (RHP-stated) | 2.59% | 2.32% | (14.05)% | 1.77% | | Net cash from/(used in) operating activities | (3,877.04) | (920.03) | 741.02 | 6,108.95 | The FY2024 loss of ₹8,385.57 million is explained: a non-cash goodwill impairment of ₹12,396.27 million. It did not cost the company cash — which is why FY2024 shows a deep accounting loss yet positive operating cash flow of ₹741.02 million. The part that matters is the inversion between profit and cash in the two most recent periods. In FY2023 the company earned ₹1,045.07 million and generated ₹6,108.95 million from operations. By FY2025 it earned ₹1,550.38 million while operations consumed ₹920.03 million. In the latest nine months it earned ₹1,623.94 million while operations consumed ₹3,877.04 million. The profit is real on paper; it is sitting in warehouses and customer ledgers. | Working capital (₹ in million) | Dec 31, 2025 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:| | Inventory | 11,915.32 | 8,272.19 | 6,198.37 | 6,169.77 | | Trade receivables | 8,850.41 | 7,875.69 | 6,271.97 | 5,535.55 | That cash gap has been plugged with debt. Total borrowings stood at ₹13,032.17 million as of December 31, 2025, of which ₹11,740.68 million was short-term. Net-debt-to-equity has climbed without pause: 0.15x in FY2023, 0.36x in FY2024, 0.58x in FY2025, 0.76x at December 2025. CMR carries CRISIL A+/Stable on long-term facilities — investment grade, but a step down from CRISIL AA-/Negative in FY2023. ## What the money is for — nothing, for the company The offer is a pure OFS of up to 32,858,323 equity shares. The company will not receive any proceeds; every rupee goes to the selling shareholders. There is no capex plan, no debt repayment, no working-capital infusion — notable for a business whose central problem is that it is consuming working capital faster than it generates it. ## Who is selling, and at what cost The four selling shareholders' weighted average cost of acquisition per share, against a price band of ₹182–192: | Selling shareholder | Type | Shares offered | Avg. acquisition cost/share | |---|---|---:|---:| | Mohan Agarwal | Promoter | up to 4,959,428 | ₹0.01 | | Gauri Shankar Agarwala HUF | Promoter group | up to 1,000,000 | ₹0.05 | | Mohan Agarwal HUF | Promoter group | up to 500,000 | ₹0.08 | | Global Scrap Processors Limited | Investor | up to 26,398,895 | Nil | Of the 32.86 million shares on offer, 26.40 million — roughly four out of every five — belong to Global Scrap Processors Limited, a financial investor whose stated acquisition cost is Nil. This is, in substance, a financial investor's exit dressed in the company's market-leadership story. The promoter family holds 83.10% before the offer and is parting with under six million shares between them. They are staying; the institutional backer is leaving. ## Valuation context Diluted EPS of ₹6.50 for FY2025 and ₹6.76 for the nine months ended December 2025 (not annualised), against a price band of ₹182–192. Because this is a pure OFS, the share count does not change after listing. | Company (RHP peer table) | Total income (₹ mn) | Diluted EPS (₹) | NAV/share (₹) | P/E | RoNW | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:| | CMR Green Technologies | 66,966.63 | 6.50 | 20.93 | Not listed | 31.08% | | Gravita India | 39,806.10 | 45.11 | 280.44 | 37.36 | 15.12% | | Pondy Oxides & Chemicals | 20,591.56 | 21.08 | 210.82 | 62.64 | 9.79% | | Baheti Recycling Industries | 5,245.39 | 17.37 | 57.02 | 34.59 | 30.46% | | Jain Resource Recycling | 64,654.39 | 7.11 | 22.44 | 76.20 | 30.55% | The RHP states an industry P/E range of 34.59x to 76.20x, average 52.70x. CMR posts strong RoNW but the thinnest margins in the group — EBITDA margin of 5.17% versus Gravita's 10.43% — the expected signature of a high-volume commodity processor. The reader has every building block to judge whether ₹182–192 against ₹6.50 of FY2025 earnings is fair next to peers trading at 35x–76x. ## The bottom line CMR is a genuine market leader — largest installed capacity in Indian aluminium recycling, blue-chip auto customers, 31 years of operating history, investment-grade credit, and a real decarbonisation tailwind. What is in dispute is whether you want to pay a peer-level premium for a thin-margin commodity processor that earned ₹1,623.94 million in nine months while burning ₹3,877.04 million in operating cash, has watched leverage climb from 0.15x to 0.76x, and is being floated entirely so a Nil-cost financial investor and a family that paid ₹0.01–₹0.08 a share can sell — with not one rupee flowing back into the business that needs working capital most. Before committing capital, pressure-test exactly one thing: whether the working-capital build of recent periods reverses and operating cash flow turns positive again, or whether this leader keeps funding its own growth with other people's debt while early backers cash out at the top. --- Disclosure: *This AI-generated analysis, based on RHP/DRHP information, is for informational purposes only. Investors should conduct due diligence and consult financial advisors before making investment decisions. Past performance does not guarantee future results, and all investments carry inherent risks including potential loss of principal.*