
Here's the thing about Indraprastha Gas.
That's not a typo. Net profit for Q2 FY27 fell to ₹24.38 crore from ₹372.51 crore a year earlier, even as average daily gas sales crossed 10 million standard cubic metres per day (mmscmd) for the first time, reaching 10.06 mmscmd.
How does that happen? It's a story about gas costs rising faster than prices, and a business model that can't fully protect itself when imported LNG (liquefied natural gas) prices go haywire.
Let's start with the raw numbers. Gross sales turnover jumped 26% to ₹5,999.13 crore, and sales volumes grew 8%. On paper, that looks like growth. But dig into the unit economics, and the picture flips.
My calculations show turnover per SCM (standard cubic metre) rose to about ₹64.8 from roughly ₹51.7 a year ago. That's an increase of about ₹13 per SCM. But net profit per SCM? It plummeted from about ₹4.35 to just ₹0.26. That's a drop of roughly ₹4 per SCM in profit.
What happened? Gas procurement costs surged. Management had already flagged that Q1 gas costs were running at about ₹40–45 per SCM, with July showing further increases. The problem is that IGL couldn't pass all of this on to customers. The company itself described its price hikes as "partially offsetting" higher input costs. Transcript
The sourcing mix tells part of the story. About 52% of IGL's gas comes from imports, with roughly 3.9–4 mmscmd from long-term contracts and the rest from pool gas and spot purchases. Spot LNG prices were hovering around USD 17–22 per mmBtu in Q1. When global LNG prices "nearly doubled" compared to the pre-crisis period, as IGL stated, and Europe rushed to stock gas for winter, the cost pressure became intense. Transcript +1
You might think selling 8% more gas would cushion the blow. It didn't. Here's why: IGL's business is highly sensitive to unit margins, not just volume.
When margins compress by ₹4 per SCM, that's nearly ₹370 crore of profit wiped out. Volume growth of 8% simply can't compensate for that kind of unit-margin collapse.
The relationship between volume and profitability is straightforward in IGL's case. The company operates with relatively modest fixed costs—employee expenses, depreciation, and finance costs totaled about ₹779 crore in FY26. Against total expenses of over ₹14,000 crore, gas cost is the dominant variable. When gas costs spike and prices can't keep up, profit evaporates regardless of how much gas flows through the pipes. Annual Report
IGL did raise prices. In fact, it hiked Delhi CNG rates five times between May and August 2026, adding roughly ₹9.89 per kg in total and taking the price to ₹86.98 per kg. That's not nothing. But it wasn't enough.
The hikes were "calibrated," in IGL's own words, and came with a lag. The August hike of ₹3.89 per kg, for instance, took effect late in the quarter, so Q2 saw little benefit. Earlier hikes in May and June only partially recovered costs.
Why not raise prices more aggressively? Competition and fuel economics set the ceiling. Management has maintained a price gap of about ₹17 per unit between CNG and petrol to keep CNG attractive. Narrow that gap too much, and volume growth—which hit 9% for CNG and 8% for PNG in Q2—would suffer. Transcript
Then there's the PNG (piped natural gas) segment. Domestic PNG prices were actually cut by ₹0.70 per SCM in January 2026, bringing Delhi's rate to ₹47.89 per SCM. I found no evidence of PNG price increases through 2026. If PNG prices stayed flat while LNG costs soared, that segment likely absorbed even more margin pressure than CNG.
The 1-point difference in volume growth between CNG (9%) and PNG (8%) doesn't explain much of the profit collapse. The real issue is how each segment handles cost inflation.
CNG has some headroom. The petrol price gap gives IGL room to pass through more costs, though it risks losing volume. PNG, especially household connections, is more constrained. Regulatory sensitivity and competition from LPG make aggressive price hikes difficult. Industrial and commercial PNG users are particularly price-sensitive, held back by an unfavorable tax structure. Transcript
Cost-to-serve differences matter too. CNG stations are high-throughput assets, likely cheaper to operate per unit of gas sold. PNG connections are dispersed, with fixed network costs spread across lower household consumption. When gas costs rise, the segment with less pricing flexibility—PNG—feels the squeeze more acutely.
IGL's massive network—over 30,000 km of pipelines and 1,000+ CNG stations—creates operating leverage. In good times, spreading fixed costs over higher volumes boosts margins. In bad times, when variable gas costs explode, that leverage works in reverse.
The good news is that IGL's fixed cost base is manageable. Depreciation runs about ₹137 crore per quarter, and finance costs are minimal at just ₹3.5 crore, thanks to a nearly debt-free balance sheet with only ₹26.59 crore in borrowings against ₹11,504 crore in net worth [stock_agent]. This financial strength means IGL isn't facing an interest burden while margins are thin.
But the infrastructure doesn't protect against gas price shocks. If anything, it amplifies them because the company must keep buying gas to keep the network running, regardless of margins.
The company has some levers to pull, though none are quick fixes. Hedging is one. IGL started Henry Hub-linked options hedging in May 2026. Expanding this could reduce exposure to spot price volatility. Transcript
Sourcing optimization is another. From September 1, 2026, a government incentive scheme provides 200 SCM of cheaper domestic APM gas for every incremental billed PNG connection. Activating the millions of unbilled PNG connections across IGL's network could significantly lower blended gas costs over time.
Capex discipline matters too. IGL plans ₹1,800–2,000 crore of capex in FY27, but about ₹500–600 crore is earmarked for diversification "if opportunities arise". In a margin crunch, discretionary spending can be deferred. Transcript
Faster, more frequent price hikes would help, but only up to a point. The petrol price gap and competitive dynamics set a hard limit. IGL's challenge isn't just passing on costs—it's doing so without handing market share to petrol, diesel, or electric vehicles.
Analysts expect some relief from improving US gas supply and the new PNG incentive scheme, but the near-term outlook remains tied to volatile LNG markets. IGL's long-term EBITDA target of about ₹7 per SCM looks distant when current margins are under severe pressure. Transcript +1
The company's strategy appears clear: prioritize volume growth and customer expansion while waiting for gas costs to stabilize. It's a risky bet. If LNG prices stay elevated for longer, IGL's infrastructure leverage could continue to work against it, turning record sales into meager profits.
For now, the takeaway is stark. In the city gas distribution business, you can sell all the gas you want, but if you can't control what you pay for it, the profits just won't follow.